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1473 
Article 
An Anti-Authoritarian Constitution?  
Four Notes 
Patrick O. Gudridge† 
“Hamdan offers principles that can set the legal world aright 
again.”1 
 
“Everyone who has followed the interaction between Congress 
and the Supreme Court knows full well that one of the primary 
purposes of the [Military Commissions Act of 2006] was to over-
rule Hamdan.”2 
 
“It is a matter of shame, but we have no choice but to conduct a 
national debate about torture.”3 
Celebrations of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld4 started too soon. 
What we make of Hamdan, it now appears, depends in impor-
tant part, at least, upon what we make of the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006.5 In this Article, I propose two suggestions 
 
†  Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I have learned much 
from Mario Barnes, Cynthia Drew, Michael Froomkin, and especially Steve 
Vladeck. Thanks also to the thoughtful and patient editors of the University of 
Minnesota Law Review and to Oren Gross for his generous invitation. Copy-
right © 2007 by Patrick O. Gudridge. 
 1. Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 
2352 (2006). 
 2. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 1478 (2007), and application denied, No. 06A1001, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 26, 
2007). Judge Randolph’s sometimes hyperbolic opinion in Boumediene in the 
end proceeds quite carefully in a way that is not entirely consistent with this 
initial assertion. See infra note 220. 
 3. Jeremy Waldron, What Can Christian Teaching Add to the Debate 
About Torture?, 63 THEOLOGY TODAY 330, 330 (2006). 
 4. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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that may fly in the face of emerging conventional wisdom. 
First, the majority opinion in Hamdan—significantly, not all of 
the opinion that Justice Stevens wrote—reveals with unusual 
clarity the surprisingly substantial impact of a seemingly non-
consequential supposition of American constitutional law—an 
assumption about the ordinary formal plurality of legal in-
struments. Hamdan, therefore, might be important theoreti-
cally independently of its immediate practical significance. 
Second, I think, the Military Commissions Act is more 
complicated than usual accounts suggest. The Act does not so 
much resolve the many questions raised by the government’s 
plans to try captured adversary combatants for war crimes—
rather, it describes a politics within which those questions 
might be posed and alternative answers might compete. Is this 
“a matter of shame”? In part, the answer turns on what the of-
ficials that the Military Commissions Act puts in charge—
especially military judges—do in exercising their authority. It 
is perhaps surprising that protection of individual rights to fair 
treatment should depend primarily on choices made by military 
judges—ultimately, on constitutional culture as they under-
stand it. But within the Act’s several parts, I think, we can 
glimpse the outlines of a recognizable constitutional dynamic, 
an organized assignment of responsibility which gives real 
weight to whatever concerns military judges elect to assert. I 
leave open the question of whether we should therefore ac-
knowledge a grudging appreciation of the efforts of the Act’s 
drafters, or rather, think harder about what our constitutional 
constructions generally accomplish. It should be clear, in any 
case, that the battle has just begun, that the outcome of the 
conflict that Congress structured is not essentially predeter-
mined.  
This Article presents itself as four freestanding notes. The 
first identifies the challenge that Justice Stevens’s opinion in 
Hamdan poses. The second note sketches, in an abstract way, 
the primary context—the “documentary substrate”—within 
which what Stevens took for granted might plausibly claim to 
be self-evident. The third effort outlines the Military Commis-
sions Act at some length, in the process underscoring the ways 
in which it confounds simpler summaries and critiques. Fi-
nally, I restate the Military Commissions Act once more, this 
time describing it in the constitutional terms its organization 
appears to suggest. 
GUDRIDGE_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:37:00 AM 
2007] ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN CONSTITUTION 1475 
 
I.  THE CHALLENGING SIMPLICITY OF  
THE HAMDAN OPINION   
The pertinent part of the majority opinion Justice Stevens 
writes in Hamdan is notably brief. An extended discussion dis-
poses of several threshold questions.6 Stevens also recounts in 
substantial detail what he calls “common law”7 in order to show 
that the commission established to try Hamdan cannot fit 
within the categories of military commissions that Presidents 
(or other executive officials or military leaders) have convened 
without specific congressional authorization.8 This discussion 
includes, among other topics, an analysis of why the charge of 
conspiracy brought against Hamdan is not “acknowledged to be 
an offense against the law of war,”9 and therefore not a proper 
basis for military commission inquiry absent congressional ap-
proval.10 Justice Kennedy refused to join this part of the Ste-
vens opinion, reducing it to plurality status.11 The Hamdan 
passage that wins majority support addresses the separate 
question of whether “[t]he procedures that the Government has 
decreed will govern Hamdan’s trial by commission” conform 
enough to the requirements of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ).12 Stevens concludes that the executive-drafted 
rules differ too much.13 He also finds that the Hamdan proce-
dures would not satisfy the “regularly constituted court” stan-
dard set in Common Article 3 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion.14 Geneva Conventions provisions are pertinent, he makes 
clear, because they are constituent elements of “the law of war” 
deemed to be controlling by the UCMJ.15 Justice Stevens out-
 
 6. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762–72 (discussing, inter alia, the possible 
preemptive effect of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the propriety of 
abstention given the circumstances). 
 7. Id. at 2775 (plurality opinion). 
 8. Id. at 2775–86. 
 9. Id. at 2780. 
 10. Id. at 2780–85. 
 11. Id. at 2799–800, 2808–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Justices 
Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion. See id. 
at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Thomas criticized this part of the Ste-
vens opinion at length. See id. at 2825–38 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 2786–93 (majority opinion). 
 13. Id. at 2790–93 (explaining that deviations from courts-martial proce-
dures “must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates it” and concluding 
that the President has failed to “justify variances from the procedures govern-
ing courts-martial”). 
 14. Id. at 2796–97 (plurality opinion). 
 15. Id. at 2794 (majority opinion). 
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lines implications of the Common Article 3 assurance of “all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”16 But Justice Kennedy again refused to join, 
reducing the Stevens opinion on this point to a plurality ef-
fort.17 
There is, of course, the obvious challenge: assuming that 
the order establishing the Hamdan tribunal fixes procedures 
inconsistent with the UCMJ model, why is the President lim-
ited by that model, even assuming that the UCMJ announces 
its own applicability? Justice Stevens acknowledges that in the 
absence of a controlling statute “the President may constitu-
tionally convene military commissions ‘without the sanction of 
Congress’ in cases of ‘controlling necessity.’”18 But because the 
UCMJ covered the Hamdan case, Stevens concludes, it was not 
necessary to explore this contingency.19 “Whether or not the 
President has independent power, absent congressional au-
thorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disre-
gard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its 
own war powers, placed on his powers.”20 Stevens notes that 
“[t]he Government does not argue otherwise.”21 But he plainly 
regards the proposition that he asserts as decisive in any event. 
Why? Justice Stevens cites Justice Jackson’s famous three-part 
categorization in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
(Steel Seizure), pointing (it seems) to Jackson’s judgment that 
presidential power “is at its lowest ebb” if executive measures 
are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress.”22 But Jackson set up his categories as a preliminary ex-
ercise, as a way of laying odds, a kind of constitutional law 
bookmaking. He found it necessary to proceed further—to ex-
 
 16. Id. at 2797–98 (plurality opinion). 
 17. See id. at 2800, 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 18. Id. at 2774 (majority opinion) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 
Wall.) 2, 140 (1866)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 2774 n.23. 
 21. Id. Justice Thomas also argued that executive officials had acted 
within the scope of authority acknowledged by pertinent congressional enact-
ments. Id. at 2823–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 22. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), cited in Hamdan, 
126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23. Cass Sunstein argues that Hamdan raised an issue 
that Justice Jackson did not address: the proper way to interpret a case in 
which a congressional action could be read as either consistent or inconsistent 
with presidential action. Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and 
National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 
June 2007). 
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plore whether particular arguments on behalf of unilateral ex-
ecutive authority were persuasive on their own terms, even in 
the face of contrary congressional action, given pertinent con-
stitutional provisions and commitments.23 Stevens sees no need 
for this added undertaking in Hamdan.24 
In an important respect, Justice Stevens stood alone. Jus-
tices Breyer and Kennedy both thought that further explana-
tion was necessary, each joining the other’s opinion in this re-
gard, each also joined for this purpose by Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg.25 Breyer evoked democracy: 
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, 
judicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Na-
tion’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that insistence 
strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic 
means—how best to do so. The Constitution places its faith in those 
democratic means. Our Court today simply does the same.26 
Justice Kennedy emphasized the virtue of stability: 
Where a statute provides the conditions for the exercise of govern-
mental power, its requirements are the result of a deliberative and re-
flective process engaging both of the political branches. Respect for 
laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and Leg-
islative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis. 
The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on standards tested 
over time and insulated from the pressures of the moment.27 
Both concurring opinions, however, beg crucial questions. 
“Democratic means” might encompass unilateral presidential 
action as well as joint legislative and executive decision mak-
ing. Most of the time, anyway, presidents win office through 
popular vote—just like senators and representatives—
notwithstanding the intricacies of the Electoral College scheme. 
Justice Breyer’s argument presupposes an account of why 
elected legislators make some distinctive democratic contribu-
tion to political processes that elected presidents cannot. 
Breyer appears to treat the UCMJ as important chiefly because 
its pertinence otherwise works to provoke further congressional 
 
 23. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 640–55 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 24. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citi-
zenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming May 2007) (“Hamdan has 
virtually nothing to do with . . . constitutional law generally.”). 
 25. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part). Justice Stevens joined neither concurring opinion, but at 
two points in the plurality opinion quoted Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 
2797–98 (plurality opinion). 
 26. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 27. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
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involvement contemporary with presidential action. Justice 
Kennedy in this respect thinks similarly—his invocation of 
“standards tested over time” is not a justification for taking the 
UCMJ seriously as such, but rather an account of how in gen-
eral the Constitution “is best preserved,” through “[r]espect for 
laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive 
and Legislative Branches.”28 “Customary operation,” though, is 
precisely the matter in question. It is not at all clear how Ken-
nedy’s formula would address the argument that circumstances 
prompting a particular executive order—say, the military order 
defining commission procedures at issue in Hamdan—were 
truly different, requiring and justifying a different, unilateral 
presidential approach. 
Justice Stevens is quite confident, as a statutory matter, 
about how to analyze the question of difference. Section 36(b) of 
the UCMJ, he is sure, puts the burden on the President to es-
tablish that it would not be “practicable” to conform military 
commission procedures to the courts-martial procedures set out 
in the larger body of the UCMJ.29 He associates section 36(b), 
added after World War II, with congressional repudiation of the 
military commission procedures put to use in the Yamashita 
prosecution upheld by the Supreme Court notwithstanding vig-
orous dissents by Justices Murphy and Rutledge.30 Stevens is 
conspicuously careful not to introduce into the Hamdan opinion 
the sense of outrage communicated throughout Justice 
Rutledge’s lengthy critique of commission procedures in In re 
Yamashita.31 It would be easy, nonetheless, to explain the rigor 
that he ascribes to section 36(b) as the statutory manifestation 
of that outrage. A statute is a statute, however. The Stevens 
reading of section 36(b) may be one plausible account, but an 
alternative interpretation that emphasizes the uniqueness of 
Yamashita might also be plausible, and thus (it might be ar-
gued) be properly adopted by the President, and just as prop-
erly accorded deference.32 Justice Stevens has surely not forgot-
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 2791–92 (majority opinion). 
 30. See id. at 2788–90; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26–41 (Murphy, J., 
dissenting); id. at 41–81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 31. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2789 n.46. 
 32. For more extensive discussion, see Stephen J. Ellmann, The “Rule of 
Law” and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming May 
2007), and Sunstein, supra note 22. 
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ten Chevron.33 His reading of section 36(b) must be motivated 
by more than his sense of legislative history.  
II.  IMPLICATIONS OF  
THE DOCUMENTARY SUBSTRATE   
It is useful to step back. There is an ordinarily unpacked 
dimension to constitutional law that Justice Stevens does not 
discuss in Hamdan—that, once recognized, maps the majority 
opinion’s otherwise implicit normative order. The discussion 
that follows, unfortunately, is in large part abstract. But I be-
gin quite concretely, with some illustrations of the difficulties 
encountered before Hamdan by judges and commentators ad-
dressing the question of presidential action in the face of con-
trary legislation. 
A. 
Steel Seizure34 exposes, Henry Monaghan declares, a “bed-
rock principle of the constitutional order.”35 Absent a suffi-
ciently specific Article II grant, “the President not only cannot 
act contra legem, he or she must point to affirmative legislative 
authorization when so acting.”36 Professor Monaghan reads 
Steel Seizure, it seems, mainly for its result—he does not 
closely associate his own analysis with any of the particular 
approaches taken by the Justices writing in the case.37 Mona-
ghan’s magisterial study, moreover, disquietingly reminds its 
readers how often and how much presidential power originates 
“off-bedrock” as a practical matter—does not derive in any di-
rect way from congressional action, instead supposes expansive 
readings of the delegation doctrine, or evokes the necessities of 
at least some exercises in foreign relations, or the brute re-
 
 33. He wrote it. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 839 (1984). 
 34. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952). 
 35. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993). 
 36. Id. 
 37. For critical discussion of the Steel Seizure opinions, with citations to 
the literature, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370–72 
(5th ed. 2005), and Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Com-
pletion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280 (2006) (sketching favorably the implications 
of Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent in Steel Seizure). 
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quirements of genuine emergencies, or simply responds to the 
ordinary pressures of responsible administration.38 
Remarkably often, judicial rulings and academic commen-
taries considering whether executive officials can proceed in the 
face of contrary congressional enactments turn out to be miss-
ing clear-cut constitutional explanations.39 For present pur-
poses, a few examples suffice.  
Judge Augustus Hand’s opinion in United States v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co.40 is the prototype, seemingly, that Justice 
Jackson drew upon in writing his Steel Seizure opinion.41 Hand 
addressed unilateral executive action blocking unauthorized 
cable landings on U.S. shores. “Certainly many, if not most, ex-
ecutive powers flow from legislative enactments.”42 The execu-
tive order could not be justified as an exercise of presidential 
war power. “[I]t is nowhere suggested that there is any hostile 
purpose in the attempt to land the cables of the Western Union 
at Miami Beach.”43 Judge Hand worried floridly about the im-
plications of upholding the executive action: 
If the President has the right, without any legislative sanction, to 
prevent the landing of cables, why has he not a right to prevent the 
importation of opium on the ground that it is a deleterious drug, or 
the importation of silk or steel because such importation may rend to 
reduce wages in this country and injure the national welfare? In the 
same way, why does not the President, in the absence of any act of 
Congress, have the right to refuse to admit foreigners to our shores, 
and to deport those aliens whose presence he regards as a public 
menace?44 
Hand also thought that, if there were sufficient evidence of 
congressional acquiescence in unilateral executive action (and 
 
 38. See Monaghan, supra note 35. 
 39. “Issues of executive power . . . are too important to be left to the kind 
of legal scholasticism that characterizes judicial opinions and much scholar-
ship on these issues.” Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2356 (2006); see also Thomas W. 
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Dele-
gation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2138–39, 2158–59 (2004) (substituting ad-
ministrative law cost-benefit analysis for indeterminate constitutional in-
quiry). 
 40. 272 F. 311 (S.D.N.Y.), aff ’d, 272 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 
754 (1922). 
 41. For discussion of Western Union as Justice Jackson’s point of depar-
ture, see Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions in the Steel Seizure 
Cases, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1107, 1110–12 (2006). 
 42. Western Union, 272 F. at 313. 
 43. Id. at 314–15. 
 44. Id. at 315. 
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there was some), the question would become political, outside 
the purview of judicial action.45 But there was, it turned out, 
more evidence of congressional acquiescence in the foreign ac-
tivities of Western Union and its counterparts. Hand ultimately 
rejected the presidential assertion of power: “Congress has gone 
too far to make this position tenable.”46 “Too far” is not an ar-
gument—nor are rhetorical questions. Judge Hand wrote elabo-
rately, but in the end remarkably narrowly.47 
Professor Monaghan treats Little v. Barreme,48 work of 
Chief Justice Marshall in 1804, as “fundamental,” as having 
“settled” the point that “the President lacks authority to act 
contra legem.”49 Marshall’s opinion is notably odd, however. A 
congressional statute authorized seizure of American-owned 
trading ships proceeding to any French port or place; presiden-
tial instructions ordered seizure whether an American ship was 
going to or returning from a French location.50 The case report 
begins with a statement of the proposition for which the deci-
sion might be understood to stand: “A commander of a ship of 
war of the United States, in obeying his instructions from the 
President . . . acts at his peril. If those instructions are not 
strictly warranted by law he is answerable in damages to any 
person injured by their execution.”51 Remarkably, Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion emphasizes that Marshall himself initially 
thought that the presidential directive should shield the com-
mander of the war ship from personal liability notwithstanding 
capture of a “returning” ship and the directive’s inconsistency 
with the Act of Congress.52 “But I have been convinced that I 
was mistaken . . . . I acquiesce in [the opinion] of my brethren, 
which is, that the instructions cannot change the nature of the 
transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions 
 
 45. See id. at 318–19. 
 46. Id. at 322. 
 47. For a more recent opinion, quite similar in effect, see Dames & Moore 
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), discussed in the text accompanying notes 91–
94, infra. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 39, at 2353–54 (suggesting that 
Justice Jackson’s Steel Seizure categories are likely to provide diffident or 
question-begging judicial analyses). 
 48. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 49. See Monaghan, supra note 35, at 24. 
 50. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FED-
ERALISM 643–62 (1993) (discussing the “quasi-war” backdrop). 
 51. Little, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 170. 
 52. See id. at 173, 179. 
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would have been a plain trespass.”53 Why should “plain tres-
pass” matter so much? There was no further explanation. 
Two Supreme Court cases decided in 1836 show the “set-
tled” question was in some sense either still up in the air or 
more complicated than Little v. Barreme might at first sug-
gest.54 Tracy v. Swartwout55 arose because a federal tariff col-
lector demanded a bond, before releasing sugar cane “sirup” to 
plaintiffs, in the amount of three cents per pound of sirup, as 
instructed by the Secretary of the Treasury, rather than fifteen 
percent of the value of the shipment, as authorized by statute.56 
The trial judge apparently reacted much like Chief Justice 
Marshall had initially in Little, and urged the jury to award 
only nominal damages against “an innocent collector”57—which 
the jury promptly did, in the amount of six cents.58 The Su-
preme Court was clear—clearer than Marshall—concerning the 
basic principle: “The secretary of the treasury is bound by the 
law . . . . It would be a most dangerous principle to establish, 
that the acts of a ministerial officer, when done in good faith, 
however injurious to private rights, and unsupported by law, 
should afford no ground for legal redress.”59 The jury charge, 
however, was treated as a matter of delicacy: 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. My colleague Stephen Vladeck argues that the strong interpretation of 
Little v. Barreme is reinforced by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Brown v. 
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). See Stephen I. Vladeck, Con-
gress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 
16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Apr. 2007). In Brown, re-
versing a decision written by Justice Story on circuit, Marshall concluded that 
the 1812 declaration of war, given contemporary understandings of the law of 
war, did not in and of itself, in the absence of more explicit congressional di-
rection, confiscate British property. Brown is obviously an important decision 
(Professor Vladeck is right in thinking that it should be more widely read). 
Marshall’s opinion—and also Story’s dissent, see Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 
129–54 (Story, J., dissenting)—illustrate the elaborate but careful combination 
of international law sources and constitutional analysis characteristic of the 
early federal period. But the case did not involve presidential or other high 
level executive action per se—rather (Marshall takes pains to emphasize) the 
independent intervention of a U.S. attorney, see id. at 121–22 (majority opin-
ion). Both Marshall and Story proceed, in large part, within a jurisprudential 
regime that gives great weight to property rights and established expectations. 
Overt executive action, within this legal context, might well have mattered 
much. 
 55. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836). 
 56. Id. at 81–82. 
 57. Id. at 86. 
 58. Id. at 83. 
 59. Id. at 95. 
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A court may not only present the facts proved, in their charge to the 
jury; but give their [sic] opinion as to those facts, for the consideration 
of the jury. But, as the jurors are the triers of facts, such an expres-
sion of opinion by the court should be so guarded as to leave the jury 
free in the exercise of their [sic] own judgments. . . . This language 
seems to be susceptible of but one construction, and that is, that as 
the plaintiffs refused to give the bond required by the collector, who 
acted in good faith, they ought to recover no more than nominal dam-
ages.60 
The trial judge would have acted properly, apparently, if he 
had urged “a most dangerous principle” more circumspectly. 
United States v. Bradley,61 another bond case,62 involved 
an attempt to collect on a pledge given by a military paymaster 
in terms prescribed by the Secretary of War encompassing pro-
visions over and above those specified by Congress. The Su-
preme Court’s ultimate conclusion sounds like Little v. Bar-
reme: 
We think, then, that the present bond, so far as it is in conformity to 
the act of 1816 . . . is good; and for any excess beyond that act, if there 
be any . . . , it is void, pro tanto. The breach assigned is clearly of a 
part of the condition . . . which is in conformity to the act; and there-
fore action is well maintainable therefor.63 
The preceding discussion, however, demonstrated at length 
that Justice Story, writing for the Court, did not think he was 
expounding constitutional law: “That bonds and other deeds 
may, in many cases, be good in part, and void for the residue, 
where the residue is founded in illegality, but not malum in se; 
is a doctrine well founded in the common law, and has been 
recognized from a very early period.”64 English cases received 
elaborate presentation;65 the Supreme Court’s own decisions, it 
seemed pretty much enough to say, showed that “a similar doc-
trine has been constantly maintained.”66 In all, Story satis-
fiedly noted, “This is not only the dictate of the common law, 
but of common sense.”67 
 
 60. Id. at 95–97. 
 61. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 343 (1836). 
 62. On the importance of bonds in early administrative law, see Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1316–18 (2006). 
 63. Bradley, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 364. 
 64. Id. at 360. 
 65. Id. at 360–63. 
 66. Id. at 363. 
 67. Id. at 364. For discussion of the distinction between common sense ju-
risprudence and common law jurisprudence, controversial in the period, see 
JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NA-
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Justice Story makes matters clear. Little, Tracy, and Brad-
ley chiefly addressed the requirements of law or equity—for ex-
ample, trespass or accounting.68 The defense of following in-
structions, to whatever extent it trumped remedy or liability, 
originated, it appeared, largely in considerations of individual 
responsibility and corrective justice, pretty much specific to the 
particular case. The agency question acquired its overall shape 
from the common law context. It is not obvious, within the set-
ting, whether the conflict of executive and congressional in-
structions mattered simply because the conflict put the officer 
immediately party to the case on notice that the limits of gov-
ernment office were not clear, or because that party was sup-
posed to have understood how to resolve the conflict. Given the 
norms marked as pertinent by the causes of action, strong 
statements of constitutional principle were at risk, subject in-
dependently of their own terms to judicial sense of the vagaries 
of the cases. 
The most prominent recent academic exploration of execu-
tive action contra legem is probably the call to arms Neal 
Katyal and Laurence Tribe issued in 2002 at the outset of the 
military commissions controversy.69 Professors Katyal and 
Tribe, exploring many matters in their essay, elaborated espe-
cially provocatively on a theme sounded in Justice Douglas’s 
Steel Seizure concurring opinion, emphasizing constitutional 
protections of individual rights as a key to organizing separa-
tion of powers thinking.70 “[O]ur Constitution’s structure,” 
Katyal and Tribe argue, is “designed in large measure to secure 
individual rights by resisting the centralization of unchecked 
power.”71 They explore at some length, in particular, the consti-
 
TIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 18–55 (2004). 
 68. See Mashaw, supra note 62, at 1321–31 (discussing common law ac-
tions as the context for the development of early administrative law). 
 69. Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: 
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002). Over and above its 
intrinsic merits, this article is noteworthy because of the prominence of its au-
thors. Professor Katyal subsequently argued on behalf of Hamdan before the 
Supreme Court. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006). Professor 
Tribe is Professor Tribe.  
 70. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 
579, 630–32 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that the Fifth Amend-
ment just compensation requirement necessitates prior congressional authori-
zation of a taking). 
 71. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 69, at 1309; see also id. at 1266 (“[I]n the 
absence of an emergency that threatens truly irreparable damage to the na-
tion or its Constitution, that Constitution’s text, structure, and logic demand 
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tutional requirement of equal protection of the laws, its appli-
cability to a scheme of military commissions targeting only non-
U.S. citizens, and the case for congressional involvement that 
the difficulties of unequal treatment suggest.72 
This approach appreciates Madisonian irony: separation of 
powers may be understood as oblique protection of individual 
rights too ubiquitous to be specified constitutionally (Madison’s 
sometime view),73 but once enumerated (his second project), 
constitutional rights suggest the appropriate organization of 
otherwise obscure constitutional assignments of institutional 
responsibility. What if unilateral executive action is seemingly 
consistent, in both its substance and the procedures that it es-
tablishes, with constitutional recognitions of individual 
rights—do separation of powers concerns therefore abate? 
Within the context in which they wrote, Professors Katyal and 
Tribe were not required to face this question.74 What if consti-
tutional understandings of individual rights are themselves 
equivocal—as much concerned with marking proper fields of 
government action as elaborating and vindicating individual 
claims? Considered closely, constitutional rights might appear 
too often too irresolute to suggest much about government or-
ganization. Indeed, the carefully structured discussion Katyal 
and Tribe present regarding equal protection ideas implicated 
in distinctions between aliens and citizens is itself suggestive.75 
“General propositions,” Justice Holmes taught, “do not decide 
concrete cases.”76 This is not quite right, obviously. There is a 
place for straightforward formulations of individual rights 
within constitutional law. But usually these wordings are put 
to work as outlines of acknowledgements—allowed to vary in 
detail—required to be evident in official instruments. It is not 
clear that straightforward formulas, standing alone, can sup-
port the weight of close separation of powers inferences. 
 
approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly cur-
tailed or abridged.”). 
 72. See id. at 1298–303. For a briefer discussion of due process implica-
tions, see id. at 1303–04. 
 73. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776–1787, at 536–43 (1969). 
 74. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 69, at 1260–66. 
 75. See id. at 1298–303. 
 76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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B. 
The requirement that—almost always—“executive officials 
must exhibit some statutory warrant”77 holds, Professor Mona-
ghan insists, as “literary theory.”78 “Literary theory” is “bed-
rock”? However ironic he means his labeling to be,79 Monaghan 
catches what he knows to be an old truth. Writing his ac-
claimed The American Enlightenment, 1750–1820, Monaghan’s 
colleague Robert Ferguson identified the emergence of “the lit-
erature of public documents” as a distinctive, plainly important 
development originating in the revolutionary and constitutional 
periods.80 Ferguson depicted the drafting of the Constitution in 
particular as a creation of “recognizable form,” a “precise ar-
rangement of tone and structure,” serving thereby as “both a 
claim of accomplishment and a rejection of prevalent fears.”81 
Within Monaghan’s own account, it is easier to notice historical 
contingency. The 1787 constitutional arrangement codifies 
1776 revolutionary rhetoric. The American conception of execu-
tive authority—its emphasis on law enforcement as opposed to 
prerogative—is first of all critical, begins as a reaction against 
the English monarchical alternative.82 The normative force ac-
quired as a result might well have struck contemporaries as 
compelling, but what substitutes now, several centuries later? 
The organizing categories of legal thought prevalent in the con-
stitutional period, need not match their subsequent (our cur-
rent) counterparts, either in substance or organization. Little v. 
Barreme, we have already seen, suggests this possibility.83 We 
risk reading backwards. 
If the Constitution counts as “literature,” it must be 
because the Constitution, constraining the diction of those who 
invoke it, “imposes itself essentially through its formal charac-
teristics,” claims a “capacity for exemplification,” in this way es-
 
 77. Monaghan, supra note 35, at 5. 
 78. Id. at 31 (“Whether or not any president can live with it, the literary 
theory of ‘The executive Power’ recognizes no presidential license to disregard 
otherwise concededly applicable legislation, even in an emergency.” (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1)). 
 79. The description of constitutional law as “literary” is initially presented 
as a slur of sorts and attributed to Woodrow Wilson. See id. at 1. 
 80. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, 1750–1820, 
at 124–49 (1997). 
 81. Id. at 137–38. 
 82. See Monaghan, supra note 35, at 12–19. 
 83. See supra text accompanying notes 48–53. 
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tablishes itself as what it is.84 Professor Monaghan presumably 
supposes something like this. It is plainly a complex endeavor: 
The Constitution acknowledges the existence of other legal 
documents and fixes aspects of the form or content of these 
documents—for example, statutes, judicial opinions, and execu-
tive orders. The Constitution thus establishes itself—
exemplifies—in part at least through processes of marking 
whatever is exemplary in these other documents.85 The Consti-
tution is a document within Professor Ferguson’s “literature of 
public documents” that encompasses—brings within its own 
diction—other public documents. It is this compounding, this 
irreducible documentary multiplicity, that characterizes the 
setting out of which constitutional law emerges, that serves as 
its “bedrock.”  
C. 
To appreciate the significance of documentary multiplicity, 
it is helpful to begin with Jeremy Bentham:  
At present such is the entanglement, that when a new statute is ap-
plied it is next to impossible to follow it through and discern the lim-
its of its influence. As the laws amidst which it falls are not to be dis-
tinguished from one another, there is no saying which of them it 
repeals or qualifies, nor which of them it leaves untouched: it is like 
water poured into the sea.86 
For Bentham, the proper response was analytic abstraction: 
Take then on the one hand all the imperative provisions belonging to 
the several laws that compose the code, add together their respective 
amplitudes: take on the other hand all the qualificative provisions be-
longing to the same laws, add together in like manner their respective 
amplitudes, on the other side; from the sum of the one combined with 
the sum of the other results the general character of the whole sys-
tem.87 
 
 84. GÉRARD GENETTE, FICTION & DICTION 21, 23 (Catherine Porter trans., 
1993). 
 85. The idea of diction is implicit, for example, in Richard Fallon’s account 
of constitutional legitimacy:  
Although it would seem rhetorical overkill to claim that Congress acts 
illegitimately whenever it passes a law that the courts subsequently 
hold unconstitutional, it might well be thought constitutionally ille-
gitimate for the President or Congress to act in deliberate defiance of 
the Constitution or to demonstrate the kind of egregiously bad consti-
tutional judgment that amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1843 (2005). 
 86. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 236 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970). 
Bentham’s manuscript, completed in 1782, was discovered in 1939. Introduc-
tion to BENTHAM, supra, at xxxi. 
 87. Id. at 237. This exercise is illustrative of Bentham’s well-known prin-
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Is all this sextant work really necessary to configure “legal ma-
terial”88 in operational terms? Formal plurality describes a 
shifting context—but it is by no means clear that this instabil-
ity is not itself open to legal address, to tectonic analysis and 
argument (as it were). Construction of a “whole system,” a well-
defined arrangement of legal propositions displacing original 
legal materials, may be one appropriate way of proceeding—but 
not a necessary course.89 
Legal documents are understood to be delimited or 
bounded, but only provisionally so, always at risk of decomposi-
tion into sequences of documents or subsumption within some 
more encompassing document.90 Documents within their own 
terms may include statements asserting norms derived from all 
sorts of sources, for example, rights and duties, depicted as 
rules, principles, or policies, for example. Legal work is kaleido-
scopic. Documents fall into patterns vulnerable to rearrange-
ment. There can be no necessary starting point or conclusion. 
Some patterns may persist or recur, and particular patterns—
so long as they persist—may define hierarchies. Patterns are 
always provisional. Aggregated or individually, documents are 
not necessarily complete or coherent. Overlaps, gaps, inconsis-
tencies, and ambiguities are common. 
These assertions suggest, among other things, that law—
insofar as its elaborations have consequences—may be a means 
 
ciple of individuation. See id. at 156–83 (“Idea of a Complete Law”); JOSEPH 
RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 70–92 (2d ed. 1980). 
 88. RAZ, supra note 87, at 72. 
 89. The discussion that follows means to bring to the surface familiar 
suppositions. It is largely written as though it states self-evident truths. In 
part I borrow from and rather abstractly restate and generalize the apprecia-
tion of the multitextual element in constitutional analysis frequently evident 
in recent commentary. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 747 (1999); Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. 
REV. 951 (2002); John Hart Ely, Interclausal Immunity, 87 VA. L. REV. 1185 
(2001); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equal-
ity, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002). I also treat as 
pertinent to contemporary American law—and once more abstract from—
explorations of the historical significance of the documentary basis of legal 
practices, and literary implications of multitextuality more generally. See, e.g., 
M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND, 1066–1307 
passim (2d ed. 1993); JOHN DAGENAIS, THE ETHICS OF READING IN MANU-
SCRIPT CULTURE 8–26 (1994); RODOLPHE GASCHÉ, THE WILD CARD OF READ-
ING 66–83 (1998); ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK 321–22 (1998); 
CHRIS WICKHAM, FRAMING THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 68, 70 (2005). 
 90. For a sophisticated appreciation of these tendencies, framed as “the 
level of generality problem,” see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL G. DORF, ON 
READING THE CONSTITUTION 73–80, 101–17 (1991).  
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either of ordering or of disrupting. Documents considered in 
isolation are politically unresolved. A given document might be 
understood as tantamount to a direct description of fundamen-
tal moral, political, economic, or cultural “facts,” and therefore 
foundational, precisely fixing legal order. But this understand-
ing might also provoke a counter-politics recalling the “merely” 
documentary status of postulated legal order, proposing to re-
place one document with another. In circumstances in which 
norms are not otherwise established, legal articulation may 
work to highlight or emphasize, and therefore work to affirm or 
establish norms, motivating political, popular, or cultural sup-
port that puts off subsequent legal revision even if such revi-
sion is not entirely precluded. But even if legal materials ap-
pear to acknowledge, for example, extant cultural or economic 
norms, the instability of legal forms may open ways to undercut 
these norms. The legal “field” (the materials that might be con-
ceived as supplying the setting or ground for legal arguments 
and conclusions) is refigured as “flux” (the recurring composi-
tion, decomposition, and recomposition of legal materials). 
In any particular legal exercise, resolving these dynamics 
preoccupies analysis side-by-side with independent considera-
tions of content. Considerations of content may shape formal 
resolution, but the opposite might also hold. Much more of or-
dinary law is concerned with textual prerequisites or relations 
than we might at first suppose. For example, statutes, judicial 
opinions, constitutions, regulations, contracts, and treaties are 
treated as defined, individuated, limited somehow in content, 
as ones among many and are also routinely broken into parts or 
subsumed (in whole or in part) into larger aggregates. Thus, 
one statute may displace another statute, or accommodate an-
other’s content; a statute may limit administrative interpreta-
tion or take its own content from that interpretation; a statute 
may limit common law or be understood to codify it. In the 
course of fixing these relations, particular terms may acquire 
prominence or may recede. Consequently, these ordering exer-
cises may change our understanding of pertinent content. 
In every instance, there is, therefore, an almost always 
routine formal politics. Law “is”—comes into being—because of 
the congruence of document specifications and conditions of sa-
lience. Document specifications are the component parts of 
would-be legal instruments—what is and what is not included 
within a given document. Conditions of salience are criteria 
that document specifications do or do not meet. Matches of sali-
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ence conditions and documentary characteristics generate 
apologetics; mismatches generate critiques. 
If the question of match or mismatch is especially difficult, 
its analysis becomes readily visible. In Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, an executive order suspending claims against Iran 
pending in American courts was clear enough in its own terms, 
but uncertain as a matter of pedigree.91 The order could invoke 
no previous congressional authorization, although it was also 
not obvious that this authorization was necessary to mark the 
order as effective.92 Justice Rehnquist artfully accumulated 
evidences of international practice, instances of congressional 
acquiescence in similar circumstances, and judicial opinions 
acknowledging “some measure” of independent presidential 
power93—in the process, he also underscored the precarious-
ness or contingency of his defense of presidential power.94 
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi95 presented a con-
verse case. There was no doubt about the power of the Presi-
dent to enter into an agreement with Germany establishing a 
fund to compensate victims of wrongful conduct by German 
companies during the Nazi era.96 On its face, however, the 
agreement did not purport to preempt aggressive state gov-
ernment efforts to come to grips with the German companies’ 
conduct.97 In several letters to state officials, federal executives 
expressed concern about the state action.98 Justice Souter, writ-
ing for a Supreme Court majority, did not assert that these ob-
viously precatory documents had “the force of law.”99 Instead, 
he argued that the casual form employed reflected a federal de-
cision: “The basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist 
where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.”100 The 
Supremacy Clause therefore ousted conflicting state require-
ments.101 Justice Ginsburg, joined by three colleagues, dis-
sented in sharply documentary terms: “As I see it, courts step 
 
 91. 453 U.S. 654, 662–68 (1981). 
 92. Id. at 675–88. 
 93. Id. at 679–82. 
 94. See Monaghan, supra note 35, at 52–53. 
 95. 539 U.S. 396 (2003). 
 96. See id. at 413–15. 
 97. See id. at 411. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 401–29; see also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 
U.S. 298, 330 (1994) (discussing “the force of law”). 
 100. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 427. 
 101. See id. at 416–17. 
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out of their proper role when they rely on no legislative or even 
executive text, but only on inference and implication, to pre-
empt state laws on foreign affairs grounds.”102 
Matches and mismatches are equally plausible states. Nei-
ther apologetics nor critique may claim priority. Legal work is 
formally an unresolved mix of both. Formal politics and norms 
declared pertinent in the content of particular documents may 
interact in two ways. Formal demands and dictates of content 
may compete in claiming priority. Or a pluralist pressure may 
manifest itself—a tendency for differing contents to co-exist 
rather than displace or recede—as a result of the formal preoc-
cupation with differentiating legal documents. It is possible 
that dictates of content might prevail by and large, and that 
the content dictated might be relatively uniform or harmoni-
ous. But it is also possible that the formal politics might 
sharply fragment documentary contents. Legal normativity is 
consequently complex. 
D. 
Constitutions are charged with a distinctive task. Whether 
individually or in the aggregate, other instruments (and thus 
the processes and norms that they posit) may be specific or gen-
eral, interconnected sets of propositions or potentially inconsis-
tent lists, decisive or highly qualified or utterly ambiguous. 
Constitutions might reveal combinations of these attributes as 
well. But if they are to succeed to any important extent in limit-
ing variation in the content of other legal instruments, if con-
stitutions are supposed to stabilize to some degree the rule of 
law, their form must somehow follow function.103 On this as-
sumption, it may not be enough to define (within or alongside 
the constitution as such) institutional arrangements charging a 
particular government body—for example, a court—with rou-
tine responsibility for interpreting and applying constitutional 
terms to validate or invalidate and thus constrain the reach of 
 
 102. Id. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For further criticism of Gara-
mendi, see Graham O’Donoghue, Note, Precatory Executive Statements and 
Permissible Judicial Responses in the Context of Holocaust-Claims Litigation, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1120–56 (2006). 
 103. For a thoughtful discussion that reverses the perspective developed 
here and treats the rule of law as organizing constitutional law, see Ellmann, 
supra note 32. In his important account, Richard Fallon uses constitutional 
law as a testing medium, as it were, in order to disaggregate the concept of 
“rule of law.” See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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other legal instruments. If the exercise of this responsibility is 
not entirely ad hoc, and thus relocate rather than address the 
underlying difficulty, interpreters must draw upon some means 
of stabilization deployed within their own efforts—organizing 
their own efforts and, as a result, organizing the efforts of other 
legal actors, even if only dialectically. There may be resources 
available, extrinsic to the constitution as such, that incorporate 
strong markers of orthodoxy and unorthodoxy—religious teach-
ings, perhaps. Alternatively, interpreters themselves might 
formulate constitutional propositions in terms that restate con-
stitutional language, but also figure as independent recurring 
elements within constitutional analysis—formulations akin to 
index terms, introducing some measure of stability by organiz-
ing argument.104 
The question, really, is what stability requires. The work-
ings of constitutional law within the larger rule of law should 
be visible. The idea that interpretive processes are appropriate, 
more or less regardless of the resources they draw upon, so long 
as they are pretty much invisible,105 is inapposite if what con-
stitutional law is supposed to supply is shape—enough basis for 
an accumulating perception that law-making exercises are not 
always precarious and open altogether to revision. This need 
not mean that constitutions must be understood to state rules, 
relatively well-defined and well-known criteria that other legal 
instruments must meet in order to be valid. Constitutions may 
indeed include such rules, but necessarily unreliably; they are 
subject to all the ordinary dangers of overlap, incompleteness, 
inconsistency, and ambiguity that legal instruments run. It 
might be enough, however, to produce the requisite sense of 
shape, if constitutional terms are thought to suggest distinctive 
preoccupations, themes coexisting over-and-above or in-and-
around their lists of rules. If it were possible to discern these 
same preoccupations—brooding omnipresences, as it were—
within the terms of other legal instruments; if it were possible 
to read these instruments as incorporating and thus acknowl-
edging constitutional themes—this might well be ordering 
enough. 
 
 104. The point of departure here, obviously, is Charles Fried’s idea of “doc-
trine.” See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS 6–10 (2004). 
 105. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE 
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 12–13, 15 (Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1993) (1880). 
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There need to be grounds for thinking that such themes 
could resist or retard the content-corroding side effects of the 
ordinary politics of law. The politics of interpretation as such—
biases influencing modes of reading—would be just as present 
in the constitutional context as elsewhere. But the results of 
the politics of legislation (or administration, or judicial opinion-
writing)—the ambiguities, gaps, and conflicts occasioned by the 
drafting process—are also evident in constitutional texts, and 
might well figure as starting points rather than obstructions 
for purposes of the process of identifying and considering con-
stitutional themes. Such seeming deformations, after all, are 
evidence of pertinent counterconcerns, to be separated out, col-
lected insofar as they recur within constitutional texts, and 
elaborated alongside the concerns they overlay—concerns 
themselves isolated, identified as recurring or not, and elabo-
rated. The results of this tabular effort might reveal structured 
hierarchies or even some unqualified concerns or commitments, 
but more likely, a series of constitutional oppositions or con-
flicts would appear. These efforts might vary from interpreter 
to interpreter. It may be sufficient, however, if the results re-
veal family resemblances—all interpreters begin, after all, with 
the same constitutional text or texts. Perhaps the text is too 
long or too diverse in its parts; perhaps it is too often amended. 
But in the hoped-for central case at least, the play of interpre-
tation unfolds within a recognizable field. 
Constitutional interpreters likely to undertake the task re-
peatedly—reviewing the work of other legal actors—would 
want their own writings to be sufficiently clear to be capable of 
influencing the decisions of those other actors. Concern for con-
sistency would therefore be pertinent, perhaps not always, but 
often enough to mark departures as notable. Interpretations 
would also more likely be influential to the extent that they de-
pict constitutional texts as clearly organized in important re-
spects—as either pointing to unequivocal conclusions, or as 
plainly preoccupied with distinctive concerns, however much in 
conflict. It is not just a question of readable signals, however. 
An interpreter judging instruments framed by other actors—
statutes, regulations, or opinions—could not determine 
whether the interpreter’s own understandings were accorded 
enough weight unless the interpreter’s own understandings 
clearly enough marked off identifying forms within constitu-
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tional texts.106 These biases, of course, need not predominate. 
They share space with the vagaries of interpretive politics in 
particular instances. Interpreters may also act, of course, on 
the basis of independently developed substantive constitutional 
agendas. But the interactive environment is not likely to be ir-
relevant: participants in processes of constitutional articulation 
and interpretation will find it difficult to work free of each 
other. Insofar as this is so, participants in these processes will 
work reciprocally, and to the extent that they do, their work 
will have the effect of stabilizing constitutional law and in the 
process the larger legal regime.107 
E. 
None of this may be especially prominent. Documentary 
competitions—in particular, the distinctive collaborative poli-
tics of establishing, maintaining, or changing constitutional 
preoccupations—are substrate movements, not directly ex-
pressed in ordinary vocabularies of processes, powers, and 
rights. Jostling documents do figure occasionally, however, and 
sometimes also importantly—irrupt, as it were—within judicial 
efforts to map the suppositions and possibilities of constitu-
tional law. 
● It was precisely Justice Brandeis’s point in 1938 Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, that common law is not “general,” is in-
stead a complex of state-by-state documentary accumulations, 
to be ascertained by studying the opinions of the courts in any 
particular state.108 John Ely’s subsequent gloss highlighted the 
federal statutory competition within which Brandeis’s supposi-
tion had become set—a reinstallation itself precisely congruent 
with Brandeis’s own conclusion.109 
 
 106. Thus, for example, the mismatch of grossly categorical legislation cri-
teria and more refined constitutional criteria emphasizing case-by-case con-
texts is the point of departure for one classic account of the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).  
 107. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 96–100 (2001), 
for an extended and notably sophisticated discussion—largely parallel, I be-
lieve—elaborating upon Michael Bratman’s theory of “shared cooperative ac-
tivity.” Michael E. Bratman, Shared Coooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327 
(1992). Coleman develops the idea of “shared cooperative activity” to interpret 
the jurisprudential notion of the rule of recognition. COLEMAN, supra, at 92–
102, 157–58. For a criticism of Coleman’s argument, see RONALD DWORKIN, 
JUSTICE IN ROBES 195–96 (2006). 
 108. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 109. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 
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● Chief Justice Hughes had already—in Home Building & 
Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell110 in 1934—recast (if only for purposes 
of one opinion) the seemingly fundamental constitutional sepa-
ration of individual freedom of contract and legislative police 
power as merely conditional, as subject to the constitutional 
equivalent of a reservations clause in a corporate charter. 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.111 in 1937 vertiginously 
depicted the similarly seemingly basic constitutional distinction 
between manufacturing and commerce, and its associated corol-
laries, as simply phrases in particular judicial opinions, docu-
ments readily replaced (and constitutional analysis thereby po-
sitioned for change) by his own opinion and its new attribution 
of priority to the constitutional understandings implicit in the 
specific statutory framework. 
● In Ex parte Endo112 and Yates v. United States,113 Justices 
Douglas and Harlan self-consciously overlaid statutory terms 
and constitutional propositions, resolving seeming dissonances 
by concluding that statutory formulations could not be read 
other than as evocations (alternate wordings keyed to particu-
lar settings) of formally primary and therefore substantively 
definitional constitutional texts.114 
● Justice Rehnquist, it might be thought, initiated the skir-
mishes preliminary to our own period precisely by insisting in 
his Arnett v. Kennedy plurality opinion that if the procedural 
due process threshold requirement of “property” was a matter 
of nonconstitutional law, then the documents disclosing that 
law had to be read on their own terms, in all their parts, proce-
dure as well as substance (“the bitter with the sweet”).115 The 
pertinence of the seemingly fundamental constitutional guar-
antee of due process suddenly appeared to turn on the chance 
play of nonconstitutional legal materials. Later, Justice Bren-
nan’s startling opinion in Plyler v. Doe seized on a strategy 
 
697–99 (1974). 
 110. 290 U.S. 398, 434–39 (1934). 
 111. 301 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1937). 
 112. 323 U.S. 283, 299–302 (1944). 
 113. 354 U.S. 298, 319–20 (1957). 
 114. For further discussion, see Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1945–68 (2003); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. 
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1850–65 
(2004) (discussing Yates and surrounding cases). 
 115. 416 U.S. 134, 154–55 (1974). A majority of the Supreme Court rejected 
Justice Rehnquist’s approach in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1985). 
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similarly grounded in documentary pluralism.116 Plyler assem-
bled its majority, it appears, by taking seriously its own status 
as an autonomous document, in the process acknowledging im-
plicitly the mutual autonomy and independence of the aggrega-
tion of judicial opinions addressing constitutional law. Brennan 
was, as a result, free to gesture in original terms and in several 
directions at once in writing Plyler, invoking a range of consti-
tutional concerns without claiming to fix authoritatively the 
pertinence of those concerns outside the context of the opinion 
itself. 
● It is easy to see that the opinion that Justice Stevens wrote 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld117 is another, notably vigorous varia-
tion. The play of constitutional argument is meaningless with-
out the presupposition from which it starts. The arrangement 
and rearrangement of documents, however many variations are 
possible, posits that there are documents, and only therefore 
play.118 A central portion of the Stevens opinion acquires 
prominence—its seemingly stubborn insistence on the “fact” of 
the statute—Stevens’s demand that provisions of the UCMJ, 
just because they were already enacted, be addressed, not be 
read as easily sidestepped, be taken seriously by the President 
in determining that they are not applicable.119 Put more ab-
stractly, the documentary substrate—its differentiations as 
well as its overlaps—cannot be treated as other than “fact.” It 
is this formal assertion, arguably, that gives the Stevens opin-
ion its normative charge. Hamdan itself becomes, as a result, 
exemplary—illustrative of what the Constitution supposes, of 
what deference to the President would deny.  
 
 116. 457 U.S. 202, 205–30 (1982). 
 117. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 118. Jean-François Lyotard makes much the same point in discussing jus-
tice conceived as a language game: 
Absolute injustice would occur if the pragmatics of obligation, that is, 
the possibility of continuing to play the game of the just, were ex-
cluded. That is what is unjust. Not the opposite of the just, but that 
which prohibits that the question of the just and the unjust be, and 
remain, raised. . . . [A]ny decision that takes away, or in which it 
happens that one takes away, from one’s partner in a current prag-
matics, the possibility of playing or replaying a pragmatics of obliga-
tion—a decision that has such an effect is necessarily unjust. 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD & JEAN-LOUP THÉBAUD, JUST GAMING 66–67 (1979) 
(Wlad Godzich trans., 1985). 
 119. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790–92. The Stevens opinion, we may 
think, is not too taciturn in its constitutional analysis—rather, entirely forth-
right even if disconcertingly matter of fact. 
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III.  THE SURPRISING COMPLEXITY OF  
THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT   
Shortly after President Bush signed into law the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, John Yoo declared victory in The 
Wall Street Journal: “The new law is, above all, a stinging re-
buke to the Supreme Court.”120 Margaret Kohn, writing in Dis-
sent, largely agreed: “The most astounding thing about the 
‘compromise’ legislation is not how little Bush conceded to his 
critics but how little they demanded. . . . Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld did very little 
. . . .”121 Remarkably, John Warner—a seemingly central figure 
in the congressional effort to revise the administration draft of 
the Military Commissions Act—appeared to concur: “The full 
flavor of what we had set out to do, it was by no means all lost, 
but . . . .”122 
Plainly, the question of what the Military Commissions Act 
does has important implications for assessments of Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.123 If the Act grants executive officials authority to 
proceed in much the same way that the Executive Order at is-
sue in Hamdan envisioned, now free from meaningful judicial 
review, the Supreme Court’s exercise may remain a notable re-
iteration of the constitutional understanding, however ex-
plained, that unilateral presidential lawmaking is almost al-
ways dubious in principle. But the point of the principle seems 
much less clear. The Act itself is complicated and conflicted. 
Proving this proposition is the purpose of the discussion that 
follows. It should become apparent that the statutory complex-
ity is not—as it appears in the legislative text as written—so 
much a product of differing Supreme Court and congressional 
views, or mostly a result of disagreement between the Presi-
dent and some prominent members of Congress. Instead, 
within the terms of statutory mechanics, the recurring inter-
play chiefly visible pits military judges against civilian admin-
istrators. Historians will, no doubt, map more precisely and de-
bate intensely the significance of this division within the 
executive branch politics of the current moment. For present 
purposes, it is important to appreciate the statutory dynamic 
 
 120. John Yoo, Congress to Courts: “Get Out of the War on Terror,” WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 19, 2006, at A18. 
 121. Margaret Kohn, Due Process and Empire’s Law, DISSENT, Winter 
2007, at 5, 5–6. 
 122. Massimo Calabresi, Late Bloomer, TIME, Feb. 12, 2007, at 47, 47. 
 123. 126 S. Ct. 2749. 
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on its own terms. The Military Commissions Act acknowledges 
administrative discretion, but it divides and overlaps responsi-
bilities. The Act presents most of the questions it addresses as 
open. This openness, in important respects, is evident even in 
the limits that the Act places on the jurisdiction of Article III 
courts. It is important to be clear: The Act does not “rebuke” ei-
ther the Supreme Court or the President. It is possible that 
participants in the statutory adjudicative politics could produce 
results either confirming fears of the President’s critics—or 
substantially checking executive ambitions and tactics. 
A. 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006124 is a compound 
statute—an aggregate or bundle. It includes a very long part,125 
a much shorter but still substantial part,126 and a collection of 
housekeeping provisions.127 The long part adds a new chapter 
47A to 10 U.S.C.128 Over the course of seven subchapters, chap-
ter 47A characterizes military commissions and the accompa-
nying participant roles;129 outlines pretrial, trial, sentencing, 
and post-trial procedures (sometimes in considerable detail);130 
and defines a long list of war crimes that are at bottom the 
commission’s reasons for being, linking these crimes with cor-
responding punishments (often death).131 A second substantial 
part amends the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, identifying 
war crimes subjecting guilty U.S. actors to criminal punish-
ment.132 The remaining provisions of the Act are mostly rules of 
construction or adjustments to existing federal statutes 
thought to be necessary to accommodate the Act’s introduc-
 
 124. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 125. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2600–31 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–
950). 
 126. Id. § 6(b), 120 Stat. at 2633–35 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441). 
 127. Id. §§ 2, 4, 5, 6(a), 6(c), 7, 120 Stat. at 2600, 2631–33, 2635–36 (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 10 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 128. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2600–31 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948–
950). 
 129. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602–06 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948b–
948e, 948h–948m). 
 130. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2606–24 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948q–
948s, 949a–949o, 949s–949u, 950a–950j). 
 131. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2624–31 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 950p–
950w). 
 132. Id. § 6(b), 120 Stat. at 2633–35 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2441). 
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tions.133 Interpretive declarations are included in the two 
longer parts of the Act as well.134 
Many of the interpretive instructions and conforming 
amendments, if juxtaposed, articulate and put into play a se-
ries of tensions. Near the beginning of new chapter 47A, for ex-
ample, Congress declares, “A military commission established 
under this chapter is a regularly constituted court, affording all 
the necessary ‘judicial guarantees which are recognized as in-
dispensable by civilized peoples’ for purposes of common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions.”135 The next provision states, 
however, that “[n]o alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to 
trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the 
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.”136 Introducing the 
War Crimes Act amendments, Congress twists similarly: 
The provisions of section 2441 of title 18 . . . as amended by this sec-
tion, fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of the Third Geneva 
Convention . . . to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches 
which are encompassed in common Article 3 in the context of an 
armed conflict not of an international character. No foreign or inter-
national source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the 
courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumer-
ated in [the amendments to the War Crimes Act].137 
If statutory assertions of conformity with Common Article 
3 mean to be understood as defensible conclusions or regulatory 
ideals, the question of how this matchup can come about 
plainly arises if participants in commission proceedings or War 
Crimes Act trials cannot look to international resources as 
guides. Perhaps the Military Commissions Act does not ban 
this kind of consultation—only conclusory assertions of “rights” 
or “rule[s] of decision.” Plainly, though, the underlying statu-
tory assumption is that the Act’s own resources will prove to be 
largely sufficient. Chapter 47A or the War Crimes amendments 
will, if properly implemented, produce as a by-product adher-
ence to Common Article 3. 
 
 133. See id. §§ 2, 4, 5, 6(a), 6(c), 7, 120 Stat. at 2600, 2631–33, 2635–36 (to 
be codified in scattered sections of 10 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 134. E.g., id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 948b(f )); id. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632. 
 135. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f )). 
 136. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)). 
The pertinent Geneva Conventions are defined earlier in the statute. Id. 
§ 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(5)). 
 137. Id. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632. 
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The military commission procedures are clearly marked as 
freestanding: 
The procedures for military commissions set forth in this chapter are 
based upon the procedures for trial by general courts-martial under 
chapter 47 . . . . Chapter 47 . . . does not, by its terms, apply to trial by 
military commission except as specifically provided . . . . The judicial 
construction and application of that chapter are not binding on mili-
tary commissions established under this chapter. . . . The findings, 
holdings, interpretations, and other precedents of military commis-
sions under this chapter may not be introduced or considered in any 
. . . proceeding of a court-martial convened under chapter 47 of this ti-
tle. The findings, holdings, interpretations, and other precedents of 
military commissions under this chapter may not form the basis of 
any holding, decision, or other determination of a court-martial con-
vened under that chapter.138 
It might appear that something very much like a quarantine is 
set up here, an acknowledgement, however oblique, that a mili-
tary commission is not in fact “a regularly constituted court.” If 
this is not the case, however, it must be evident that chapter 
47A procedures possess a distinctive integrity. The procedures 
should describe and secure a more or less self-contained mode 
of inquiry and adjudication. 
There is, in fact, a considerable, if also sometimes quali-
fied, effort to establish “relative autonomy” revealed in the ex-
tended statutory scheme. The independence of judges (and 
other military participants) is guarded through direct prohibi-
tions,139 conflict of interest rules,140 and declarations that con-
sideration of commission service is prohibited for promotion 
purposes.141 A bill of rights incorporated in the procedures rec-
ognizes a right to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, 
and “examine and respond” to admitted evidence.142 Defense 
counsel are also provided a “reasonable opportunity” to compel 
the attendance of witnesses and the production of other evi-
dence.143 Rights to counsel include the opportunity to retain ci-
vilian counsel as well as assigned military defense counsel.144 
 
 138. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(c), 
(e)). 
 139. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2609–10 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949b(a)). 
 140. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2604 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 948j(c)). 
 141. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2610 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949b(b)). 
 142. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(1)(A)). 
 143. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2614 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949j(a)). 
 144. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2604–05, 2610 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
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Accused individuals have a right to be present (in most circum-
stances),145 and a right to defend themselves independently of 
counsel (subject to some limitations).146 Absent required show-
ings, trials are public.147 A “verbatim record of the proceedings” 
is mandatory.148 Appellate review available to defendants en-
compasses administrative review,149 military judicial scru-
tiny,150 jurisdiction afforded the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, and the opportunity to petition the 
Supreme Court.151 A version of the double jeopardy rule ap-
plies.152 Independently of chapter 47A itself, section 6(c) of the 
Military Commissions Act prohibits “cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment or punishment,” and defines proscribed acts 
by incorporating—at one step removed—Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment understandings.153 
B. 
These are not the only “inside” boundary-guards.154 But 
there is also a central difficulty. “Classified information shall 
be protected and is privileged from disclosure if disclosure 
would be detrimental to the national security.”155 The privilege 
 
§§ 948k, 949c). 
 145. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(1)(B)). 
 146. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(1)(D)). 
 147. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2611 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949d(d)). 
 148. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2617 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949o). 
 149. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2618–20 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950b). 
 150. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950f ). 
 151. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2622 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950g). 
 152. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2614 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949h). 
 153. Id. § 6(c), 120 Stat. at 2635. The constitutional understandings apply 
“as defined in the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understand-
ings to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment done at New York, 
December 10, 1984.” Id. § 6(c)(2), 120 Stat. at 2635. 
 154. See, e.g., id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2616 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949l(c)) (placing on the prosecutor the burden to prove guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt); id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2615 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949k) (allowing for the defense of lack of mental responsibility). But see id. 
§ 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(B)) (“Evi-
dence shall not be excluded from trial . . . on the grounds that the evidence 
was not seized pursuant to a search warrant or other authorization.”). 
 155. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(1)(A)). 
GUDRIDGE_4FMT 6/15/2007 9:37:00 AM 
1502 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1473 
 
“applies to all stages of the proceedings of military commis-
sions,”156 and may be claimed by heads of executive or military 
departments or government agencies finding that “information 
is properly classified” and that disclosure would be “detrimen-
tal to the national security.”157 Alternatively, these officials 
“may authorize a representative, witness, or trial counsel” to 
assert the privilege and make the requisite findings.158 This 
delegated authority “is presumed in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary.”159 “During the examination of any witness, trial 
counsel may object to any question, line of inquiry, or motion to 
admit evidence that would require the disclosure of classified 
information.”160 Trial counsel—the prosecutor—may also re-
quest a presiding judge to authorize “deletion of specified items 
of classified information from documents to be made available 
to the accused.”161 
If classified information is relevant, in whatever way, to 
the commission inquiry, the risk that the inquiry will be dis-
rupted—diverted from what would be its ordinary course—is 
obvious. Whether information should be classified is not a ques-
tion that commission participants are authorized to resolve. 
The presiding judge does not confer directly with pertinent de-
partments or agencies—rather “trial counsel” (the prosecuting 
attorney) is assigned the task at the request of the presiding 
judge, “to consult with the department or agency concerned as 
to whether the national security privilege should be as-
serted.”162 The problem posed by the need to protect classified 
information plainly introduces an extrinsic element—likely a 
large matter in some cases—into the trial process. Equally 
plain, because chapter 47A assigns primary responsibility to 
the prosecuting attorney not just for consulting third parties, 
but for raising the issue,163 the ordinary balance of the adver-
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(1)(B)). 
 158. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(1)(C)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(2)(C)). 
 161. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2614 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949j(c)(1)(A)). 
 162. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612–13 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(2)(C)). 
 163. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612–13 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
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sary trial—the roughly equal responsibilities of prosecuting 
and defense counsel—may be considerably skewed in particular 
cases. Clearly, the ramifications of the national security privi-
lege are significant. 
Not surprisingly, civilian defense counsel, if retained, must 
“protect any classified information received during the course of 
representation.”164 But the civilian counsel also must be “de-
termined to be eligible for access to classified information that 
is classified at the level Secret or higher.”165 Clearance investi-
gations are time-consuming. Therefore, if they cannot be con-
ducted in the course of trial, the universe of available civilian 
defense counsel shrinks considerably. 
Importantly, chapter 47A declares that “[n]o person shall 
be required to testify against himself” in a commission proceed-
ing, and prohibits admission of statements made previously 
that were “obtained by use of torture.”166 “Torture” is not de-
fined in the procedural parts of chapter 47A.167 Statutory lan-
guage, however, anticipates that in particular cases “the degree 
of coercion” linked with proffered statements might be “dis-
puted” and therefore obligates the presiding military judge to 
consider, among other things, whether “the totality of the cir-
cumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing suf-
ficient probative value.”168 But if the identity of the individual 
 
§ 949d(f )(2)(B)–(C)). 
 164. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2610 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b)(4)). 
 165. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2610 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b)(3)(D)). 
 166. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2607 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a)–
(b)). 
 167. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2601–02 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 948a). Torture is defined in subchapter VII dealing with punitive matters as 
one of a list of offenses, if committed by “[a]ny person subject to this chapter,” 
warranting imprisonment or death. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2627 (to be codi-
fied at 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(11)). Torture is characterized as “an act specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . upon another 
person within . . . custody or physical control for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation or a confession.” Id. There is no cross-reference to this definition in 
the “exclusion of statements obtained by torture” section. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 
Stat. at 2607 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b)). 
 168. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2607 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c)(1), 
(d)(1)). Additional pertinent factors depend upon whether statements were ob-
tained before or after enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. If before, the military judge must also consider 
whether “the interests of justice would be best served by admission of the 
statement into evidence.” § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2607 (to be codified at 10 
U.S.C. § 948r(c)(2)). A post-Act statement may be admitted, even if found to be 
reliable and in service of the interests of justice, only if “the interrogation 
methods used to obtain the statement do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or de-
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interrogators, the length of their interrogations, the specific 
content of their questions, or the details of their conduct during 
the course of questioning is classified information, the reliabil-
ity inquiry might be considerably compromised,169 if “the total-
ity of the circumstances” cannot be directly judged as a result. 
Hearsay evidence that would not be admissible in general 
courts-martial proceedings may be admitted in military com-
mission inquiries if, inter alia, “the particulars of the evidence 
(including information on the general circumstances under 
which the evidence was obtained)” are “ma[de] known to the 
adverse party.”170 Even so, hearsay might be excluded upon 
demonstration that “the evidence is unreliable.”171 If “the par-
ticulars of the evidence” include classified matter, however, the 
procedure cannot run its course. “The disclosure of evidence . . . 
is subject to the requirements and limitations applicable to the 
disclosure of classified information.”172 
To be sure, chapter 47A authorizes presiding judges, “to 
the extent practicable,” to delete specified items of classified in-
formation from documents to be introduced into evidence, to 
substitute a part or a summary of the information in place of 
classified information, or to substitute “a statement of relevant 
facts that the classified information would tend to prove.”173 
What if a judge concludes that these alternatives are not ade-
quate replacements? As a general matter, “[t]he military judge 
in a military commission under this chapter shall rule upon all 
questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence,” and 
“[a]ny ruling . . . upon a question of law . . . is conclusive.”174 Al-
 
grading treatment” as defined in the Detainee Treatment Act. Id. § 3(a)(1), 
120 Stat. at 2607 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(d)(3)). Is the implication, 
therefore, that the fact of “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” is not per-
tinent in evaluating “the interests of justice”? 
 169. “A statement of the accused that is otherwise admissible shall not be 
excluded from trial . . . on grounds of alleged coercion . . . so long as the evi-
dence complies with the provisions of section 948r . . . .” § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 
2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(C)). 
 170. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608–09 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(2)(E)(i)). 
 171. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2609 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(2)(E)(ii)). 
 172. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2609 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(2)(E)(i)). 
 173. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2612 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(2)(A)). 
 174. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2615–16 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949l(b)). 
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though chapter 47A does not make the point explicitly, it is 
clear that this general grant of authority includes the authority 
to deny military prosecutors the opportunity to introduce sub-
stitutes if they invoke the national security privilege.175 “[T]he 
United States may take an interlocutory appeal to the Court of 
Military Commission Review of any order or ruling of the mili-
tary judge that . . . excludes evidence that is substantial proof 
of a fact material in the proceeding” or that relates to a matter 
under the provisions dealing with protection of classified in-
formation.176 If necessary, the United States can appeal once 
more, to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, which may exercise jurisdiction at its discretion.177 
C. 
The “convening authority”—the Secretary of Defense or a 
delegate178—reviews “[t]he findings and sentence of a military 
commission” upon receipt of a written report, whether or not 
the defendant submits “matters for consideration.”179 The con-
vening authority also has the “sole discretion and prerogative” 
to “modify the findings and sentence of a military commission” 
as a matter of course.180 “[T]he convening authority may, in his 
sole discretion, approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the 
sentence in whole or in part,” “dismiss any charge or specifica-
tion by setting aside a finding of guilty,” or “change a finding of 
guilty . . . to a finding of guilty to . . . a lesser included offense,” 
but “may not increase a sentence.”181 The convening authority 
may also, “in his sole discretion, order a proceeding in revision 
or a rehearing.”182 Rehearing requires new commission mem-
bers183 (in effect, a new jury) and, of course, moots the defen-
 
 175. See also MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS pt. II, R. 701(f )(7), at 38 
(2007) [hereinafter MMC] (recognizing broad judicial authority). 
 176. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2620 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950d(a)(1)(B)–
(C)). 
 177. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950d(d)). 
 178. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2603 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948h). 
 179. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2618–19 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950b(a)–(b), (c)(2)(B)). 
 180. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2619 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(1)). 
 181. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2619 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950b(c)(2)–
(3)). 
 182. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2619 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950b(d)(1)). 
 183. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950e(a)). 
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dant’s right to appeal a final judgment.184 However, the Act 
does not explicitly allow for either revision or rehearing to be 
ordered because findings or sentences strike the convening au-
thority as too pro-defendant.185 
The repeated references to “sole discretion”186 are thus 
somewhat overstated, but they are also of a piece—with grants 
of discretionary authority to the Secretary of Defense or dele-
gates—scattered throughout the procedural parts of chapter 
47A.187 The most general, perhaps, is this: 
Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including elements and 
modes of proof, for cases triable by military commission under this 
chapter may be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, in consulta-
tion with the Attorney General. Such procedures shall, so far as the 
Secretary considers practicable or consistent with military or intelli-
gence activities, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence 
in trial by general courts-martial. Such procedures and rules of evi-
dence may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.188 
This grant is also notable: 
The Secretary of Defense may prescribe additional regulations, con-
sistent with this subsection, for the use and protection of classified in-
formation during proceedings of military commissions under this 
chapter. A report on any regulations so prescribed, or modified, shall 
be submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the House of Representatives not later than 60 days before the date 
on which such regulations or modifications . . . go into effect.189 
Chapter 47A involves the President only very occasionally after 
the initial, carefully framed authorization “to establish military 
commissions under this chapter for offenses triable . . . as pro-
vided in this chapter.”190 
 
 184. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2620 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950c(a)). 
 185. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2619, 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 950b(d)(2)(B), 950e(b)). 
 186. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2619 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950b(c)–(d)). 
 187. See, e.g., id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2603, 2605–06, 2613–14, 2617–18 
(to be codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948d(d), 948l(a), 949g(a)(2), 949o(a), 949u(a)). 
 188. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a)); 
see also id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950f(c)) 
(stating that the Secretary prescribes procedures for Court of Military Com-
mission Review). 
 189. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2613 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949d(f )(4)). 
 190. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(b)). 
There is, however, this provocative declaration: “Orders publishing the pro-
ceedings of military commissions under this chapter are binding upon all de-
partments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States, except as oth-
erwise provided by the President.” Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2623 (to be 
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Chapter 47A does not provide for judicial review of exer-
cises of discretion by the Secretary of Defense or a delegate. 
There is, however, no express language prohibiting presiding 
military judges from declaring regulations invalid.191 Section 
3(b) of the Military Commissions Act puts in place a congres-
sional notice requirement that might, inter alia, serve as a 
trigger for responsive legislative action: “Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth 
the procedures for military commissions prescribed under chap-
ter 47A . . . .”192 Section 6(c)(3) of the Act, also independently of 
chapter 47A itself, obliges the President to establish adminis-
trative rules and procedures to “ensure compliance” with the 
section 6(c)(1) prohibition of “cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment” of individuals in the custody or con-
trol of the United States.193 
D. 
The list of “[c]rimes triable by military commissions”194—
twenty-eight offenses in all195—is notable for its length and the 
considerable drafting effort to achieve precise definitions of 
terms, sometimes through cross-references to other U.S. stat-
utes.196 In advance of the list itself, the question of the culpabil-
ity of higher authorities, of individuals who organize but do not 
have immediate connections to triable crimes, is also elabo-
rately addressed. “Principals” are persons “punishable . . . un-
der this chapter” who “commit[] an offense punishable by this 
chapter, or aid[], abet[], counsel[], command[], or procure[] its 
 
codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(a)). 
 191. For further discussion considering provisions for appellate review in-
cluded in chapter 47A and the general authority statutorily granted commis-
sion judges, see infra Part III.E and note 251 and accompanying text. 
 192. § 3(b), 120 Stat. at 2631. A similar requirement included in chapter 
47A addresses protections of classified information over and above statutory 
guards. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2613 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(4)). 
 193. Id. § 6(c), 120 Stat. at 2635. 
 194. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2625–30 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950v). 
 195. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2626–30 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950v(b)(1)–(28)). 
 196. See, e.g., id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2625 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950v(a)(1)–(3)) (definitions); id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2627 (to be codified at 
10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(11)(B)) (cross-reference); id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2627–28 
(to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(12)(B)) (definition and cross-references). 
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commission[,] . . . cause[] an act to be done which if directly 
performed . . . would be punishable,” or act as “a superior com-
mander who . . . knew, had reason to know, or should have 
known, that a subordinate was about to commit such acts or 
had done so and who failed to take the necessary and reason-
able measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetra-
tors thereof.”197 “Solicitation” opens another avenue of ap-
proach: “Any person subject to this chapter who solicits or 
advises another or others to commit one or more substantive 
offenses triable . . . under this chapter shall . . . be punished 
with the punishment provided for the commission of the offense 
. . . .”198 “Conspiracy,” moreover, is the last of the substantive 
offenses included in the statutory list: “Any person . . . who con-
spires to commit one or more substantive offenses triable . . . 
under this chapter, and who knowingly does any overt act to ef-
fect the object of the conspiracy, shall be punished . . . by death 
or . . . by such punishment . . . as a military commission . . . 
may direct.”199 Chapter 47A insists that this elaborate statu-
tory effort aims only to “codify offenses that have traditionally 
been triable by military commissions” and therefore “does not 
establish new crimes that did not exist before its enactment.”200 
The chapter 47A offenses and surrounding amplifications 
are notably more ambitious—at least on first reading—than 
the parallel provisions included in section 6 of the Military 
Commissions Act amending the separate War Crimes Act to 
add nine offenses statutorily deemed “a grave breach of com-
mon Article 3” of the Geneva Conventions.201 But it is also ar-
guable that most of the chapter 47A offenses—including the 
principal, solicitation, and conspiracy offenses—might be sub-
sumed within the War Crimes Act offenses as simply particular 
instances. This form of argument would seem to be entirely ap-
propriate if the chapter 47A offenses are not “new crimes” but 
 
 197. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2624 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950q). 
 198. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2625 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950u). 
 199. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2630 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950v(b)(28)). 
 200. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2624 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950p(a)); 
see also id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2624 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950p(b)) 
(“Because the provisions of this subchapter (including provisions that incorpo-
rate definitions in other provisions of law) are declarative of existing law, they 
do not preclude trial for crimes that occurred before the date of the enactment 
of this chapter.”). 
 201. Id. § 6(b)(1)(B), 120 Stat. at 2633–34 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2441(d)). 
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rather “declarative of existing law.”202 Section 6 of the Military 
Commissions Act announces that “[n]o foreign or international 
source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the 
courts of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions 
enumerated in [the amendments to the War Crimes Act].”203 
Section 6, however, does not prohibit interpretations grounded 
in chapter 47A provisions. Chapter 47A declares that “[t]he 
findings, holdings, interpretations, and other precedents of 
military commissions under this chapter may not form the ba-
sis of any holding, decision, or other determination of a court-
martial convened under [chapter 47].”204 Notably, this statutory 
ban too does not extend to references to the language of chapter 
47A itself. Nor does it seem to apply to trials of individuals who 
allegedly commit War Crimes Act offenses, but who would be 
tried in courts other than courts-martial. 
There may be good reasons to read apposite provisions of 
chapter 47A as a kind of interpretive gloss of the War Crimes 
Act amendments. If the added War Crimes Acts offenses are 
declaratory of traditional understandings—simply more gen-
eral versions of the chapter 47A declarations—then the War 
Crimes Act additions too might presumptively apply retroac-
tively. Section 6 of the Military Commissions Act indeed con-
cludes by specifying that the War Crimes Act amendments 
generally apply to acts committed after November 26, 1997,205 
nearly ten years prior to Congress’s approval of the Military 
Commissions Act—a substantial retroactive reach. The Mili-
tary Commissions Act, however, qualifies its retroactive reach, 
providing that the immunity granted by the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 “shall apply with respect to any criminal 
prosecution that . . . relates to the detention and interrogation 
of aliens” described in the Detainee Treatment Act, and also 
“relates to acts occurring between September 11, 2001, and De-
cember 30, 2005.”206 The Detainee Treatment Act immunity ex-
tends to any “officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or 
other agent of the United States Government who is a United 
States person.”207 It addresses criminal prosecutions “arising 
 
 202. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2624 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950p(b)). 
 203. Id. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632. 
 204. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2602 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(e)). 
 205. Id. § 6(b)(2), 120 Stat. at 2635. 
 206. Id. § 8(b), 120 Stat. at 2636. 
 207. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1004(a), 119 
Stat. 2739, 2740. 
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out of . . . engaging in specific operational practices, that in-
volve detention and interrogation of aliens . . . and that were 
officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time 
that they were conducted.”208 It is a defense that the covered 
individual “did not know that the practices were unlawful and 
a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know 
the practices were unlawful.”209  
This defense (and therefore the Military Commissions Act 
War Crimes Act immunity) is, it appears, limited in two ways. 
Individuals claiming the defense must be charged with “engag-
ing in specific operational practices” (torture or the like). “Prin-
cipals” or “conspirators”—insofar as they come within the com-
pass of the War Crimes Act additions—who do not directly 
“engag[e]” in charged acts may not be able to claim the defense. 
Even if “principals” and “conspirators” who draft and legally ra-
tionalize “specific operational practices” might be thought to be 
“engaging,” these individuals could be hard put to claim “[g]ood 
faith reliance on advice of counsel” to show that “a person of or-
dinary sense and understanding would not know the practices 
were unlawful” if their efforts involved exposure to legal mate-
rials indicating that “specific operational practices” were indeed 
unlawful. 
If War Crimes Act offenses substantively encompass chap-
ter 47A crimes, an otherwise apparent gap closes, or at least 
narrows. The Military Commissions Act insists that its changes 
to the War Crimes Act are exhaustive. “The provisions . . . as 
amended . . . fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of the 
Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide ef-
fective penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encom-
passed in common Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict 
not of an international character,”210 and also acknowledge 
other Geneva Conventions responsibilities.211 The concomitants 
of these other duties are left to presidential discretion: “[T]he 
President has the authority for the United States to interpret 
the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to 
promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. § 6(a)(2), 120 Stat. at 2632. 
 211. Id. § 6(b)(1)(B), 120 Stat. at 2635 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2441(d)(5)) (“The definitions in this subsection are intended only to define 
the grave breaches of common Article 3 and not the full scope of United States 
obligations under that Article.”). 
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for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave 
breaches.”212 Presidential action (if undertaken) would, it ap-
pears, have the force of law.213 The idea, it seems, is to create a 
gapless whole, a joint product of congressional and presidential 
effort. But if War Crimes Act offenses define only a subset of 
the “traditionally . . . triable” chapter 47A offenses, either the 
additional chapter 47A offenses would not be Common Article 3 
“grave breaches” if committed by U.S. personnel, or notwith-
standing the congressional aim to “fully satisfy” the Geneva ob-
ligation, the War Crimes Act changes did not address anything 
like Geneva “grave breaches.” If the War Crimes Act changes 
and chapter 47A are read together as a common project, the 
question of the Geneva gap recedes, and the congressional 
commitment to “fully satisfy” seems a more likely label for the 
congressional efforts. 
E. 
Not surprisingly, given its initial insistence on its own 
autonomy, the chapter 47A provisions included in the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 include an exclusivity declaration re-
garding judicial review: 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter . . . , no court, justice, or 
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of 
action whatsoever, including any action pending on or filed after the 
date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, relat-
ing to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission 
under this chapter, including challenges to the lawfulness of proce-
dures of military commissions under this chapter.214 
Somewhat more elaborately, section 7 of the Military Com-
missions Act amends 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e): 
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an 
alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the 
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant 
or is awaiting such determination. 
  . . . Except as provided in . . . the Detainee Treatment Act . . . , no 
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any 
other action against the United States or its agents relating to any 
 
 212. Id. § 6(a)(3)(A), 120 Stat. at 2632. 
 213. Id. § 6(a)(3)(C), 120 Stat. at 2632 (“Any Executive Order published 
under this paragraph shall be authoritative (except as to grave breaches of 
common Article 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as 
other administrative regulations.”).  
 214. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2623–24 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950j(b)). 
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aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of con-
finement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and 
has been determined by the United States to have been properly de-
tained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.215 
New § 2241(e) reformulates and generalizes a provision in-
cluded in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005: 
[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or con-
sider— 
(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf 
of an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay . . . ; or  
(2) any other action against the United States or its agents relat-
ing to any aspect of . . . detention . . . of an alien . . . who— 
(A) is currently in military custody; or  
(B) has been determined . . . to have been properly detained 
as an enemy combatant.216 
Schlesinger v. Councilman holds that Article III federal 
courts should ordinarily refuse to rule on matters pending in 
on-going courts-martial proceedings.217 In Hamdan, the Ste-
vens majority opinion concluded that Councilman’s premises 
were inapposite because Hamdan was not a member of the U.S. 
military and because the independence of the military tribunals 
challenged in the case was not sufficiently clear.218 The opinion 
also noted in passing that Councilman itself recognized an ex-
ception in cases involving “defendants who raise substantial 
arguments that a military tribunal lacks personal jurisdiction 
over them.”219 The Military Commissions Act—inter alia, hav-
ing put in place various measures to foster tribunal independ-
ence—appears to put in place its own version of Councilman in 
chapter 47A, and extends protection of the autonomy of its own 
regime of commissions and appellate review in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(e) to include the process of determining the threshold 
question of personal jurisdiction.220 
 
 215. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2636 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)). 
 216. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 
Stat. 2739, 2741–42, amended by § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2636 (to be codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(e)). 
 217. 420 U.S. 738, 761 (1975). 
 218. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2771 (2006). In dissent, 
Justice Scalia argued that, although Councilman does not control, it provides 
a close analogue. Id. at 2818–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 219. Id. at 2772 n.20 (majority opinion); see also Councilman, 420 U.S. at 
746 (“[T]his general rule carries with it its own qualification—that the court-
martial’s acts be ‘within the scope of its jurisdiction and duty.’” (quoting Smith 
v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886))). 
 220. Notably, Judge Randolph’s majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, 
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In this regard, the Military Commissions Act notably sub-
stitutes “awaiting . . . determination” as the key, replacing the 
Detainee Treatment Act emphasis on “custody” (or the fact of 
detention at Guantánamo Bay). “Awaiting determination” con-
notes, it would seem, “pending conclusion of a process already 
underway.” Article III habeas corpus or federal question juris-
diction, on this reading, may well remain available in cases of 
“languishing” individuals—detained aliens sitting in confine-
ment past any reasonable delay in scheduling or conducting 
combatant status hearings.221 That construction, interestingly, 
would be consistent with ordinary federal judicial usage in a 
longstanding, wide range of cases. “So long as the claim is 
pending and awaiting final determination in the department, 
courts should not be called upon to interfere; at least unless it 
ignores such claim, or fails to pass upon it within a reasonable 
time.”222 
 
476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007), and applica-
tion denied, No. 06A1001, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 26, 2007), for all of its rhetorical 
flourishes, e.g., id. at 987 (“This is nonsense.”), in the end carefully refused to 
treat the habeas petition at issue (and denied) the equivalent of a Detainee 
Treatment Act appeal, thus leaving open the possibility of such an appeal and 
the opportunity for close scrutiny of Combatant Status Review Tribunal pro-
cedures. See id. at 994. This Article, I should emphasize, does not address the 
question of whether the Military Commissions Act procedures (or the Detainee 
Treatment Act procedures) are constitutionally adequate substitutes for ha-
beas corpus review. Instead, the concern here is the necessary prior inquiry—
the question of what the statutory procedures are (or what their possible char-
acteristics might be). 
 221. See Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Some at Guantanamo Mark 5 
Years in Limbo, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2007, at A1 (noting that the Supreme 
Court rejected the claim that the government could detain prisoners indefi-
nitely). 
 222. United States v. Fletcher, 147 U.S. 664, 667–68 (1893). For a sampling 
of recent judicial opinions using the phrase “awaiting determination” in vari-
ous contexts in which “determination” is plainly in the offing, see Padash v. 
INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004), In re Harmsen, 320 B.R. 188, 195–96 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2005), Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351–54 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005), Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 375 F. Supp. 2d 577, 585–90 (E.D. 
Mich. 2005), and In re Candidus, 327 B.R. 112, 120 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
Constitutional concerns occasionally become evident. Regarding criminal pro-
cedure, see, for example, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 
(1991), which creates a presumption that a probable cause hearing for indi-
viduals arrested without a warrant will occur within forty-eight hours. The 
risk of “languishing,” however, also triggers constitutional scrutiny outside 
ordinary criminal law settings. Notably, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the ma-
jority in Schall v. Martin, emphasized the regime of strict deadlines for vari-
ous judicial hearings that New York had put in place in upholding the consti-
tutionality of its system of pretrial detention of juveniles presenting serious 
risks of criminal behavior. 467 U.S. 253, 269–71 (1984); see also Ly v. Hansen, 
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The Military Commissions Act treatment of any “other ac-
tion” (than habeas corpus) is also limited. Chapter 47A author-
izes the Secretary of Defense to execute “a sentence of confine-
ment adjudged by a military commission” in “any penal or 
correctional institution under the control of the United States,” 
but if such an institution is “not under the control of an armed 
force,” confined individuals must be “subject to the same disci-
pline and treatment as persons confined or committed by the 
courts of the United States or of the State, District of Columbia, 
or place in which the institution is situated.”223 The implica-
tion, it seems, is that usual constitutional or statutory stan-
dards for treatment of inmates govern detainees confined in 
nonmilitary federal or state prisons. If equal treatment, as 
guaranteed by chapter 47A, is not in fact afforded, it is possible 
that, if the Secretary of Defense has promulgated pertinent 
regulations, a Department of Defense administrative remedy 
might be available.224 In the absence of administrative remedy, 
however, neither chapter 47A itself nor the Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005 appears to offer recourse—although familiar 
federal civil rights of action would seem to address the prob-
lem.225 If the “other action” limitation added to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(e) is understood to protect the autonomy of chapter 47A 
and Detainee Treatment Act procedures, and if proceedings de-
scribed by these statutory sources are in fact concluded, indi-
viduals who were formerly described as “detainees” or “alien il-
 
351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding due process problems posed and a habeas 
inquiry justified by extended indefinite detention before an INS hearing). Jus-
tice Stevens argued in dissent in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. 
that the possibility of extended administrative delay in concluding proceedings 
initiated at the discretion of competitors constituted a violation of due process 
owed to businesses that, in the interim, are barred from entering particular 
areas of business. 439 U.S. 96, 121–24 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion concluded that the conflicting interests involved, 
and the underlying concerns prompting the legislation, showed the procedural 
scheme to be reasonable notwithstanding the risk. Id. at 97 (majority opinion). 
In Zinermon v. Burch, the Supreme Court held that Florida’s failure to provide 
procedures for sufficiently quick review of civil commitment initiated by an 
individual herself or himself was a due process violation. 494 U.S. 113, 138–39 
(1990). The idea at work in all of these cases, it appears, is the notion of the 
duty to protect that the government owes persons over whom it exercises ju-
risdiction, in particular those whom it holds in custody, and the “correlative 
right of protection” these individuals may claim. See Logan v. United States, 
144 U.S. 263, 295 (1892). 
 223. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 
Stat. 2600, 2617–18 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949u). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
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legal combatants,” but whose status is now best characterized 
as “federal or state prison inmate” would still, it seems, have 
recourse to usual federal civil remedies. 
IV.  THE CONSTITUTION SUGGESTED   
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, it is easy to con-
clude, acknowledges the criticisms of the commission proce-
dures Justices Kennedy and Stevens noted in their Hamdan 
opinions. Justice Kennedy’s concerns that military judges pre-
side and that their independence and the autonomy of their 
proceedings be protected226 are—we have seen—addressed by 
the Act itself.227 Independence and autonomy are also recurring 
topics glossed in the Trial Manual that the Department of De-
fense has promulgated as part of the process of implementing 
the Act.228 Kennedy also stressed the absence of worked-out 
rules of evidence within the procedures at issue in Hamdan.229 
The Trial Manual includes an evidence code.230 Justice Stevens 
pointed to the entirely relaxed approach to hearsay evidence 
adopted in the original commission rules, to the simultaneous 
use and exclusion of classified matter that was envisioned, and 
to the likely absence of defendants from crucial proceedings.231 
The Act and the Trial Manual deal with these matters equivo-
cally—but in each instance in the end assign responsibility to 
presiding military judges to handle matters properly.232 
 
 226. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2805–07 (2006) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part). 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 139–53. 
 228. See, e.g., MMC, supra note 175, pt. II, R. 104, at 8–9; id. pt II, R. 108, 
at 9; id. pt. II, R. 109, at 9–11; id. pt. II, R. 503(b), at 26; id. pt. II, R. 902, at 
80–81. The Manual will likely prove to be an extraordinarily rich resource for 
purposes of studying the impact of the military judicial sensibility on admini-
stration of the Military Commissions Act. It is, unfortunately, not possible to 
discuss the Manual in any detail here. 
 229. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2807–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 230. MMC, supra note 175, pt. III. 
 231. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786–87. 
 232. See, e.g., MMC, supra note 175, pt. II, R. 701(f ), at 37–38. Rule 905(j) 
is especially provocative:  
Except as otherwise provided in this Manual, any matters which may 
be resolved upon motion without trial of the general issue of guilt may 
be submitted by a party to the convening authority [the Secretary of 
Defense or delegates] before trial for decision. Submission of such 
matter to the convening authority . . . is, in any event, without preju-
dice to the renewal of the issue by timely motion before the military 
judge. 
Id. pt. II, R. 905(j), at 84. 
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In this connection, as in other contexts, the Military Com-
missions Act leaves substantial questions open to determina-
tion within statutory processes. It is entirely possible, there-
fore, that the Act will operate as a charade—apparently 
complex adjudicative processes will march, however intricately, 
to foreordained conclusions. But is also possible that military 
judges will take seriously their responsibilities, not only in light 
of their own constitutional understandings, but in view also of 
what they take the Act’s background norms to be. The question 
of the “theory of the act”233—the content of its implicit constitu-
tion—becomes, therefore, especially important. 
The theory of rights: The Military Commissions Act, we 
have seen, repeatedly acknowledges individual rights in the 
course of its descriptions of procedures for trying enemy com-
batants. It incorporates—even if filtered through treaty 
terms—the important constitutional norms of due process of 
law and equal protection of the laws and the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.234 These guarantees 
are depicted as already defined, as extrinsic to the arrange-
ments that the Act sets up, thus not subject to—rather pre-
sumably recognized within—the Act’s own definitions and 
elaborations. Several more specific preoccupations are immedi-
ately shaped by the Act itself, however. Exclusion of evidence 
obtained by torture or coercion, recognition of rights to counsel 
and to address evidence, stipulations of burdens of proof, and 
allowances of appeals all acknowledge the status or interests of 
individuals, and accord individuals weight within commission 
processes.235 It is just as plain, though, that the extent that in-
dividual concerns may be met, although statutorily established 
as a pertinent question, is not necessarily a matter of clear-cut 
answers. The Act fixes a context within which individual con-
cerns are recognized, but also put in competition with other 
considerations the Act treats as serious. 
Individual rights within the Act are not “trumps” in the 
Dworkinian sense.236 Rights, rather, are “topics,” issues to be 
addressed, marked as relevant but also unresolved.237 The end 
 
 233. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). 
 234. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 235. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
§ 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2607 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r). 
 236. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1978).  
 237. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of 
American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998). 
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result might be subordination of individual concerns and insis-
tence on the priority of prosecutorial or other goals. Outcomes 
in particular cases may depend (if matters are not especially 
clear cut) on whether military judges exercise their authority 
under the Act to decide, for example, whether interrogation is 
too coercive to allow admission of seemingly probative state-
ments or whether substitutes for excluded classified informa-
tion are too lacking to allow trial to go forward. Or regulations 
governing commission proceedings written by Department of 
Defense policymakers may prove aggressive enough to be deci-
sive in particular cases one way or another. 
The question of relative autonomy: The sometimes overlap-
ping jurisdictions of policymakers and military judges may 
foreshadow a statutory version of constitutional checks and bal-
ances—“[a]mbition . . . made to counteract ambition.”238 The 
crucial question, though, is whether the possible conflict will 
manifest itself in practice, manifest itself often enough to mark 
(however obliquely) affirmative responses to individual con-
cerns as not just theoretical possibilities. 
The possibility that military judges might see themselves 
as relatively autonomous, and act accordingly, is not without 
underpinnings. The Constitution acknowledges that the Ameri-
can military establishment encompasses distinctive legal insti-
tutions.239 The elaboration of these institutions is a longstand-
ing project. Its history shows significant commitments to 
substantive synthesis (the Lieber Code, famously240) and proce-
dural coherence (the UCMJ241). In his remarkable new book, 
David Kennedy notes how elaborately “law in war” figures in 
American military thinking and practice.242 But he also won-
ders whether twentieth century jurisprudential transforma-
 
 238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 2003); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Check-
ing Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2324–
27 (2006); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of 
Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 607–49 (2001). 
 239. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (giving Congress the power to make 
rules for the “Regulation of the land and naval Forces”); id. amend. V (grant-
ing grand jury privileges “except in cases arising in the land or naval forces”). 
 240. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF 
THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (N.Y., D. Van Nostrand 1863), reprinted in 
RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45–72 
(1983). 
 241. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801–946 (West 1998 & Supp. 2006), amended by Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 4, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631. 
 242. DAVID KENNEDY, OF LAW AND WAR 5–12 (2006). 
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tions, evident here as elsewhere, have weakened the normative 
force of “law in war” in the process of translating military legal-
ity into the increasingly widely useful language of risk and op-
portunity.243 Within the politics that the Military Commissions 
Act encodes, however, military judges may find it difficult not 
to be attentive to legal risks American personnel face—risks in 
part created by the collection of crimes defined in the Act it-
self244 and in part presented by potential military adversaries 
looking to American practice as justification for their own mili-
tary prisoner regimes. Actions military judges take in the 
course of trials of illegal combatants, therefore, might respond 
not only to the circumstances of cases at hand, but to a felt 
need to signal an affirmative commitment to marking legal lim-
its restricting efforts of American interrogators and prosecutors 
prompted precisely by American military interests. 
The stance of the military judges—whether they are to be 
considered more or less independent actors within the politics 
of the Military Commissions Act—becomes especially pertinent 
in evaluating the reach of administrative rulemaking in fixing 
commission procedures. For example, as we have seen, new 10 
U.S.C. § 949a(a) declares that “[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial 
procedures, including elements and modes of proof . . . may be 
prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Attorney General.”245 And again, new § 949d(f)(4) states: “The 
Secretary of Defense may prescribe additional regulations, con-
sistent with this subsection, for the use and protection of classi-
fied information . . . .”246 If the application of regulations in a 
particular case “materially prejudices the substantial rights of 
the accused,” enforcement of the regulations—if the regulations 
were invalid—would be “an error of law.”247 Therefore, review 
falls within the jurisdiction of a Court of Military Commission 
Review established by the Act,248 and the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit—insofar as challenged regula-
tions are arguably inconsistent “with the standards and proce-
 
 243. For the gist of the overall argument, see id. at 25, 45, 86, 129. 
 244. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2626–30 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950v(b)(1)–(28)). 
 245. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a)). 
 246. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2613 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(4)). 
 247. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2618 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950a(a)). 
 248. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950f(d)) (“[T]he Court may act only with respect to matters of law.”). 
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dures specified in this chapter” or “the Constitution and the 
laws of the United States.”249 Supreme Court jurisdiction fol-
lows.250 Appellate review, obviously, supposes an original rul-
ing. Under the Act, this is the job of the commission judge; the 
pertinent statutory language is broad and unqualified: 
The military judge in a military commission . . . shall rule upon all 
questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence and all inter-
locutory questions arising during the proceedings. 
   . . . Any ruling made by the military judge upon a question of law 
. . . is conclusive and constitutes the ruling of the military commis-
sion. However, a military judge may change his ruling at any time 
during the trial.251 
Contra Chevron?: Apparent equipoise—administrators is-
suing regulations constraining military judges, military judges 
scrutinizing the legality of administrative regulations—may be 
a mirage. If judges conclude that regulations are to be under-
stood as exercises of statutorily conferred discretion, and as 
such properly upheld routinely, statutory politics becomes 
mostly hierarchical, more a matter of following orders than 
checks and balances. In the face of broad administrative lee-
way, the independence of military judges (or indeed Article III 
judges) becomes irrelevant except, presumably, in cases of 
clear-cut constitutional or statutory transgressions. New 
§ 949a(a)—the principal grant of regulation-writing authority—
 
 249. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2622 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c)). 
 250. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2622 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950g(d)). 
 251. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2615–16 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949l(b)); see also id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2611 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949d(a)(1)(A)) (noting that a military judge may call a session without the 
members present for the purpose of “hearing and determining motions raising 
defenses or objections which are capable of determination without trial of the 
issues raised by a plea of not guilty”). Administrative review following trial 
and preceding exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of Military Commission Re-
view is, it seems, another occasion for consideration of the legality of regula-
tions. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2618–20 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 950b). Nothing in the Act, however, plainly enough suggests—given the em-
phatic grant of commission judge authority to rule on “all questions of law”—
that post-trial administrative inquiry is the first stage at which objections to 
regulations are to be brought (although they may need to be raised at this 
stage to make possible subsequent appellate review). See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 
Stat. at 2621 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950f(c)). Statutory congressional no-
tice requirements, and the obligation imposed on the President to secure hu-
mane treatment, see supra text accompanying note 193, raise the possibility of 
extra-judicial redress: presidential implementation of an administrative 
scheme aimed at broad protection might indeed be preemptive, but any legis-
lative or executive response that is entirely hypothetical, likely to be occa-
sional at best, or otherwise ineffectual would be correspondingly less likely to 
displace judicial review. 
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does in fact include language suggesting regulatory discretion: 
“Such procedures shall, so far as the Secretary considers practi-
cable or consistent with military or intelligence activities, apply 
the principles of law and the rules of evidence in trial by gen-
eral courts-martial.”252 The emphasis given to administrative 
perspective seemingly evokes the distinction Justices Stevens 
and Kennedy drew in Hamdan between discretion-granting 
wording (keying to point of view) and wording consonant with 
close judicial review (neutral with regard to point of view).253  
But the very next sentence of new § 949a(a) limits discre-
tion: “Such procedures and rules of evidence may not be con-
trary to or inconsistent with this chapter.”254 Similar language 
structures administrative authority to issue regulations con-
cerning commission use of classified information.255 New 
§ 949a, in particular, supplies much working material for con-
structing a sense of “chapter” norms. The miniature bill of 
rights set out in subsection (b) suggests a basic model of proce-
dural fairness.256 The safe harbors—optional regulations 
deemed authorized in advance, as it were—also included in the 
same subsection include their own constraints—for example, 
the “probative value” requirement and the cross-referenced 
prohibition of torture and limits on uses of coercive interroga-
tion.257 As a matter of negative implication, moreover, they re-
inforce or elaborate the Act’s basic model of fairness. The Mili-
tary Commission Act need not be read as itself establishing a 
regime of regulation-writing laissez-faire. 
If so, the statutory phrase “the Secretary considers practi-
cable or consistent” requires explanation. The Hamdan distinc-
tion, it appears, excludes a “middle” option that the Commis-
sions Act puts in place. The key is “this chapter”—the limit that 
new § 949a(a) sets constraining judicial scrutiny of regulations. 
The Secretary of Defense may properly “consider[] . . . military 
 
 252. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a)). 
 253. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2791 (2006); id. at 2801 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 254. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a)). 
 255. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2613 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§ 949d(f )(4)) (“The Secretary of Defense may prescribe additional regulations, 
consistent with this subsection, for the use and protection of classified infor-
mation . . . .”). 
 256. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949a(b)(1)). 
 257. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2607–09 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 948r, 949a(b)(2)). 
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or intelligence activities” (or other considerations of practical-
ity) in determining whether to use general courts-martial pro-
cedures.258 Judges cannot second guess these judgments. They 
can look only to the military commission provisions in the Act 
in order to determine whether particular regulations are prob-
lematic. This restriction, while it declares off-limits judicial 
policymaking per se, does not prevent military commission 
judges from addressing “questions of law”—for example, consti-
tutional law—that the Act does not declare to be irrelevant.259 
The statutory characterization of the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, included within 
chapter 47A itself, encompasses the “Constitution and the laws 
of the United States.”260 This appellate jurisdiction derives 
from rulings by commission judges concerning “all questions of 
law,” a jurisdiction also granted by chapter 47A.261 
Notably, the interplay of military commission judges and 
regulation-writing administrators is not an accident of statu-
tory incompleteness or weakness of will. The Military Commis-
sions Act itself organizes this structure. In the process, the Act 
does not, for example, resolve the question of which interroga-
tion practices amount to torture or are otherwise too coercive or 
too unreliable or the question of whether commission trials can 
proceed if important evidentiary sources are deemed unavail-
able because classified. Instead, the statutory scheme arranges 
a politics, a contest pitting administrators and judges, within 
which these questions will find answers, whether as a rule or 
case-by-case. The Act is not therefore just another example of 
often-decried congressional abdication through delegation.262 
Its interplay, moreover, provides no occasion for Chevron defer-
ence263 or somesuch on the part of reviewing courts—
 
 258. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2608 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a)). 
 259. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2615–16 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949l(b)). 
 260. Id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2622 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950g(c)(2)). 
 261. See id. § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. at 2615–16 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§ 949l(b)). 
 262. For recent explorations of nondelegation concerns, see Merrill, supra 
note 39, at 2103–09. 
 263. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (“[Chevron] posited that courts have a 
duty to defer to reasonable agency interpretations not only when Congress ex-
pressly delegates interpretative authority to an agency, but also when Con-
gress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a statute that an agency is charged with 
administering.”). For a more recent exploration of Chevron’s complexities, see 
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
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administrative rulemakers and military commission judges are 
equally participants in the statutory politics.264 The statutory 
arrangement functions as a constitution. It defines the competi-
tion of adjudication and administration, identifies background 
values as well as immediate vocabularies. It also motivates at-
tention to individual rights and problems of fair treatment not 
only by marking the statutory process as the means to compli-
ance with acknowledged international obligations, but also by 
juxtaposing and overlapping the statutory lists of foreign and 
American combatant criminal conduct. 
  ∗ ∗ ∗ 
This arrangement is not, plainly enough, “a machine that 
would go of itself.” The motivations it presupposes and prompts 
may be entirely missing from the agendas of administrators or 
military judges or indeed Article III judges. Any of whom may, 
as a result, push statutory procedures in some other direction. 
It is, however, a “rule for government” of the sort that John 
Marshall and his contemporaries (or Robert Cover) would have 
likely recognized—a context within which official responsibility 
might be judged (not simply excused).265 
 
 264. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 39, at 2364 (noting that courts may 
show uncomfortableness at “choosing sides” as a grounds for refusing Chevron 
deference). “While it seems quite clear under current law that the lead agency 
is entitled to Chevron deference, should this also be the case where Congress 
has specifically intervened to strengthen the role of lateral agencies over at 
least some aspects of decisionmaking?” J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public 
Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2302–03 (2005) (footnote 
omitted). 
 265. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JU-
DICIAL PROCESS passim (1975); Patrick O. Gudridge, The Office of the Oath, 20 
CONST. COMMENT. 387, 401–02 (2003) (discussing John Marshall).  
